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LAW AND EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY:
OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES
Owen D. Jones*
Modern evolutionary biology increasingly offers powerful insights into
possible origins and functions of human social behavior. Thus far, how-
ever, evolutionary biology has rarely been applied as a tool of legal analy-
sis.1 Contrast its invocation, for example, with that of economics.2
Perhaps part of the disproportion between the use in law of economics
and of biology is attributable to the phenomenon that many lawyers seem
to choose their profession more from aversion to science than from love
of law.3 The fundamentals of economic reasoning seem somehow less
foreign to legal reasoning than does a scientific avenue of inquiry.
Yet few areas of law have been untouched by developments in biology,
* Associate Professor, Arizona State University College of Law; B.A., 1985, Am-
herst College; J.D., 1991, Yale Law School. Lars Noah, Eric Dodson Greenberg, William
Zimmerman, Mariam J. Naini, Kimberly Blaivas, and John H. Beckstrom offered thought-
ful and welcome comments on the ideas contained here. I owe particular thanks to Guido
Calabresi, to whom this volume of the journal is dedicated, for his patient guidance, wise
counsel, and warm friendship.
1. The Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral Research, however, continues to
make significant progress in encouraging the integration of social sciences and evolution-
ary perspectives. See, e.g., MARGARET GRUTER, LAW AND THE MIND: BIOLOGICAL ORI-
GINS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1991); LAW, BIOLOGY & CULTURE: THE EVOLUTION OF LAW
(Margaret Gruter & Paul Bohannan eds., 1983). See also JOHN H. BECKSTROM, EVOLU-
TIONARY JURISPRUDENCE: PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS ON THE USE OF MODERN DAR-
WINISM THROUGHOUT THE LEGAL PROCESS 28-47 (1989) [hereinafter EVOLUTIONARY
JURISPRUDENCE]; JOHN H. BECKSTROM, DARWINISM APPLIED: EVOLUTIONARY PATHS TO
SOCIAL GOALS 1-21 (1993) [hereinafter DARWINISM APPLIED]; Richard D. Alexander, Bi-
ology and Law, 7 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 167 (1986); Owen D. Jones, Reproductive
Autonomy and Evolutionary Biology: A Regulatory Framework For Trait-Selection Tech-
nologies, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 187 (1993).
2. Dean Calabresi, of course, is a prominent figure in law and economics. See, e.g.,
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). Economic analysis
of law and policy has extended to everything from property to sex. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND
REASON (1992).
3. Science, after all, often requires math.
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and it is unlikely that many lawyers will be able to avoid familiarizing
themselves with some of the relevant facts, technologies, and theories
emerging from the field. Criminal law, for example, has been forever
changed by the new forensic techniques of DNA fingerprinting. Tort law
increasingly involves complex questions of toxicity- and causation, and
employment law could soon find corporations discriminating among ap-
plicants on the basis of negative genetic profiles. In addition, the law of
contracts has been considerably agitated by the advent of surrogacy, the
law of property now grapples with ownership of human embryos, and
new technologies, such as the recent cloning of human embryos, present a
whole new thicket of legal, ethical, social, and religious issues.
Although biology multiplies such new challenges, it can also provide
illumination. The field of evolutionary biology, in particular, explores bi-
ological bases of (as well as relations between) physical structures and
behaviors. An explosive growth in empirical research, the sustained and
refining pressure of cross-disciplinary critiques, and the theoretical ad-
vances to which such pressures contribute, provide insights worth careful
study for their potential contribution to the increasingly complex analyses
of contemporary social and legal issues.4
This article begins by outlining the most basic principles of evolution-
ary biology of which lawyers and lawmakers should be aware. It then
briefly discusses, and finds generally unjustifiable, four reasons why evo-
lutionary perspectives are often excluded from the theater of human be-
havioral analysis. Finally, the article highlights three of the numerous
ways evolutionary biology can prove useful to socio-legal inquiry and
policymaking. With specific examples, it demonstrates how evolutionary
biology can assist in predicting contexts in which undesirable behavior
(such as child abuse) may arise, in clarifying the contours of articulated
values (such as the relationship between reproductive autonomy and the
opportunity to select for specific characteristics in children), and in sug-
gesting methods for reducing the incidence of certain undesirable behav-
iors (such as incest). These examples illustrate the utility of evolutionary
4. The contribution of evolutionary biology should not be confused with that offered
by the study of bioethics. The latter uses ethics to illuminate what should be done about
issues directly implicating biology, such as euthanasia or abortion. In sharp contrast, a law
and evolutionary biology approach uses evolutionary biology itself as a source to illuminate
what might be done about issues that may be classically biological, such as trait-selection
technologies used to influence offspring characteristics, or only remotely so, such as crime
reduction. See, e.g., Jones, supra note.1; DARWINISM APPLIED, supra note 1.
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perspectives on human social behavior to social analysts, as well as to
lawmakers in the role of social governors.
I. THE EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY PERSPECTIVE
In order to understand the origins of certain misperceptions about evo-
lutionary analysis of human affairs (which will be explored in Part II),
and to recognize the specific ways in which such analysis may serve social
and legal goals (taken up in Part III), it is important first to review briefly
three basic principles of evolutionary biology.5 For evolutionary biolo-
gists, these principles govern the increase or decrease over time in the
percentage of a population that shares any particular genetically influ-
enced trait.
A. The Basic Mechanism of Evolution Is Natural Selection, Operating
at the Level of the Gene
Assume a single individual exhibits a particular genetically influenced
physical or behavioral trait. If the trait renders that individual more
likely to survive to reproductive age and/or to produce more offspring
than individuals without the trait, then the gene coding for the trait is
commensurately more likely to be replicated into the next generation
than genes coding for alternative traits.6 "Natural selection" is the pro-
cess by which, if the trait remains advantageous over time, the percentage
of individuals within that population bearing the trait will increase.7
Therefore (and to oversimplify slightly), natural selection effects relent-
less pressure upon each organism to maximize its "inclusive fitness,"
which is essentially the proportion of a population, in a given future gen-
eration, that will carry copies of the organism's various genes after its
death.'
5. For a basic introduction to evolutionary biology and mechanisms of natural selec-
tion, see ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION (1985); RICHIARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH
GENE (1976); RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER (1986); MARTIN DALY &
MAR0 WILSON, HOMICIDE 2-5 (1988).
6. This is, of course, a simplification. More specifically, since "continual generation
of random variation is continually followed by differential survival and proliferation that is
nonrandom, the more adaptive forms persist ... while their alternatives perish." DALY &
WILSON, supra note 5, at 3 (summarizing Darwin).
7. Such randomly-arising physical traits (like the long necks on a few early giraffes)
can be so much more successful than competing traits (like short necks) that many genera-
tions hence they may be exhibited by the vast majority of the population. The same can be
true for certain genetically influenced behavioral traits, such as migratory patterns.
8. One's own inclusive fitness calculus includes not only one's own reproductive suc-
cess (the number of direct descendants) but also the reproductive success of genetic rela-
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While early evolutionary theorists, in particular, argued that natural se-
lection may operate at the level of the group, rather than at the level of
the gene, this debate has been largely resolved in favor of the gene-selec-
tionists.9 Gene-selectionist models of the development of apparently al-
truistic behavior, for example, such as animal alarm calls, far more
accurately predict observed behavior within a species, such as selective
infanticide and cannibalism, than do group-selectionist models.10 This
means that no genetically influenced behavior can evolve simply because
it is good for the group; it must also (in fact, primarily) confer an advan-
tage to an individual in the sense of promoting that organism's inclusive
fitness.
B. Natural Selection Affects Both Genetically Influenced Physical and
Behavioral Traits
Most of the traits that define the majority of living organisms are ge-
netically influenced. While people tend to think of genes as merely the
tives, devalued by the degree of genetic relatedness. For a useful summary of the
mechanism of natural selection, see DALY & WILSON, supra note 5, at 2-5. The inclusive
fitness theory developed during the early 1960s. See, e.g., W.D. Hamilton, The Genetical
Evolution of Social Behaviour, 7 J. THEORETICAL BIOL. 1 (1964).
9. See, e.g., TRIVERS, supra note 5, at 67-85 (discussing "The Group Selection Fal-
lacy") and recent sources cited at 433-55.
10. Id. People used to cite as evidence of group selection the fact that in some insect
species individuals devote all their energies to servicing offspring of the queen. Insects,
however, have a haplo-diploid rather than diploid chromosomal structure. See generally
Robert L. Trivers & Hope Hare, Haplodiploidy and the Evolution of the Social Insects, 191
SCIENCE 249 (1976); TRIVERS, supra note 5, at 169-202; RANDY THORNHILL & JOHN AL-
COCK, THE EVOLUTION OF INSECT MATING SYSTEMS (1983). Consequently, since a haplo-
diploid individual is more related to its own sibling than it would be to its own offspring,
such insect behavior is not only consistent with gene selection, but collateral support for it.
Similarly, many group selectionists pointed to the apparently altruistic warning calls of
ground squirrels as supposed evidence of behavior that evolves for the good of the group,
at a high cost to an individual. Later study revealed that the behavior of ground squirrels,
too, fits the gene selection model. See, e.g., Warren G. Holmes & Paul W. Sherman, Kin
Recognition in Animals, 71 AM. SCIENTIST 46 (1983); Warren G. Holmes & Paul W. Sher-
man, The Ontogeny of Kin Recognition in Two Species of Ground Squirrels, 22 AM. ZOOL-
OGIST 491 (1982); Robert L. Rivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV.
BIOL. 35 (1971) [hereinafter The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism]; TRIVERS, supra note 5,
at 109-44. The propensity to call is directly correlated to the local concentration of rela-
tives. Ground squirrels, moreover, are notoriously cannibalistic, primarily of unrelated
pups. See generally Paul W. Sherman, Nepotism and the Evolution of Alarm Calls, 197
SCIENCE 1246 (1977); Paul W. Sherman, Kinship, Demography, and Belding's Ground
Squirrel Nepotism, 8 BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 251 (1981); Paul W. Sher-
man, Reproductive Competition and Infanticide in Belding's Ground Squirrels and Other
Animals, in NATURAL SELECTION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: RECENT RESEARCH AND NEW
THEORY 311 (Richard D. Alexander & Donald W. Tinkle eds., 1981).
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architects of the body, genes also play a direct and significant role in the
behavior of each organism." Were this not true, complex mating rituals
in non-sentient creatures would be impossible. And web-spinning spiders
would be incapable of spinning webs (notably similar among members of
a single species) despite their physical ability to do so. Often such behav-
iors are characterized as "instinctive," but such a description fails to con-
vey the range of behaviors that are influenced to a greater or lesser extent
by genetic factors.
Importantly, genetically influenced structural and behavioral traits are
necessarily interdependent. It is generally the unique combination of
physical structure and behavior that determines an individual's likelihood
of survival, reproductive success relative to its contemporaries, and, ulti-
mately, its inclusive fitness. Natural selection thus operates on the combi-
nation of structures and behavior. It tests whether a given organism with
one type of structure, when behaving in a particular way, is more or less
likely to survive and reproduce in a single environment than is a different
organism, possessing a different combination of structures and behaviors,
in the same environment.
C. Natural Selection Operates Inexorably Upon Things That
Reproduce
Evolution remains a constant process, so long as there is reproduction
and the potential for genetic variation. All living things are constantly
subject to selective pressures that make them more or less likely to
reproduce more successfully than their neighbors. Because the human
species is as much engaged in this process of continual development as is
any other, we may expect that common genetically influenced physical
and behavioral traits are in a constant state of flux, to the extent that
random mutation may introduce competitive traits, or that environmental
conditions may render historically adaptive traits maladaptive (and vice
versa).
11. The material supporting this proposition is voluminous, exploring, in part, how
genes design the neural circuits that underlie behavior through the controlled developmen-
tal interactions of nerve cells. See generally sources compiled in TRIVERS, supra note 5, at
433-55; DALY & WILSON, supra note 5, at 299-321; RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, THE BIOL-
OGY OF MORAL SYSTEMS 265-80 (1987); HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOUR: A DARWIN-
IAN PERSPECTIVE (Laura Betzig et al. eds., 1988); see also MARTIN DALY & MARGO
WILSON, SEX, EVOLUTr7ION, AND BEHAVIOR (1983).
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II. OBSTACLES TO INTEGRATING EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY IN SocIo-
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Historically, there have been a number of obstacles to invoking evolu-
tionary biology as relevant to any analysis of human affairs. Four deserve
particular mention.
A. Inertia in Public Perception: Anchoring Evolutionary Biology to
Only Its Early Formulations
Darwin popularized the notion that inherited physical traits are subject
to the evolutionary pressures of natural selection. Although some of
Darwin's work also addresses the evolution of certain behavioral charac-
teristics, it was not until E.O. Wilson's publication of Sociobiology: The
New Synthesis in 1975 that the general public was presented with a
methodical argument that the selective forces affecting physical traits also
affect inherited behavioral traits in all animals, including humans. 2 This
is an uncomfortable vision, to be sure, and it has posed a significant ob-
stacle to the incorporation of evolutionary perspectives in socio-legal
analyses.
But modern evolutionary biology is not about Wilson's book. Wilson's
efforts were undeniably farsighted and groundbreaking. Yet, as in many
an ambitious and pioneering endeavor, the theoretical system Wilson out-
lined appears to have included, along with the main premises, a number
of more problematic and controversial starts. Unfortunately, many of the
latter have continued vitality in the public mind. They are improperly
associated with the core and surviving tenets of evolutionary biology, de-
spite their nearly universal rejection by modem evolutionary biologists
who have simply and systematically moved on.
The early formulations, therefore, remain a fertile source of once accu-
rate, but now outdated and often moot, criticism.13 Part of this phenome-
12. EDWARD 0. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOOY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS (1975). This built, in
part, upon the significant and prior works of Hamilton, Williams, and Rivers, among
others. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 8; GEORGE C. WILLIAMS, ADAPTATION AND NATU-
RAL SELECTION: A CRITIQUE OF SOME CURRENT EVOLUTIONARY THOUGHT (1966); The
Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, supra note 10.
13. It is in part due to this anchoring effect, and the public association of the field with
the school of thought of E.O. Wilson and Charles Lumsden, that many sharing an evolu-
tionary (that is Darwinian or adaptationist) perspective refrain from using the term "soci-
obiology." Jerome H. Barkow, Overview, 10 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 1, 8-9 (1989).
While other terms have been considered, such as human ethology, behavioral socio-ecol-
ogy, evolutionary psychology, or biocultural anthropology, no general agreement has
emerged. This is due, in part, to a shared sense that Darwinian perspectives should be
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non, of course, may be attributed to cycles inherent in academic research,
analysis, writing, publishing, and critiquing. Each stage takes time, and it
is inevitable that by the time a thoughtful critique has been published it
will, in part, be obsolete. Yet a large part is also and independently at-
tributable to the rate of growth. The explosive increase of evolutionary
perspectives in a wide variety of fields has resulted in unusually rapid
accumulations of empirical data (supporting some theories and challeng-
ing others), as well as in rigorous intellectual ferment. For while the
learning curve in evolutionary theory has been unusually steep, befitting
its recent application to human behavior, the time lag between new ad-
vances in theory and public perception of the same remains as constant as
it does in older and more slowly evolving disciplines. The disparity,
therefore, between those theories that are current and those theories that
are critiqued remains frustratingly large.14
This would be less troublesome were people less dismissive. But the
popular response to sociobiology is itself a cultural artifact worthy of seri-
ous study. There is something Galilean in it. Because of some weak-
nesses in the details of the original theory, people have tended to dismiss
the entire theoretical system, even in its later iterations. This makes
about as much sense as concluding that the earth does not revolve around
the sun simply because the idea's first proponent posited a perfectly cir-
cular orbit and later evidence revealed non-circularity.
15
The combination of early, incompletely refined ideas, and gross misde-
scription of evolutionary theory in the public press, has afforded many
casual observers the luxury of confident complacency in their dismissal of
integrated with existing disciplines, rather than the basis for a separate field. Id.; see also
EVOLUTIONARY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 1.
14. For example, Philip Kitcher's thought-provoking, insightful, and rigorous 1985
book on sociobiology purports to eviscerate certain aspects of the field but in fact devotes
much of its effort to criticizing theories from the late 60's and 70's that were pre-formative,
and in some cases already abandoned. See PHILIP KITCHER, VAULTING AMBITION: SOCI-
OBIOLOGY AND THE QUEST FOR HUMAN NATURE (1985).
15. Some dismissiveness, it seems, may derive from an anti-bio bias, rooted in certain
perceived but illusory distinctions between the life and physical sciences. Biology seems
more accessible, as people tend, for example, to have a more intuitive understanding of the
fundamental interaction of egg and sperm than they do of electromagnetic fields, dark
matter, pulsars, quarks, and fusion reactions. The effects are profound. People are more
likely to expect the frontiers of a physical science (like astronomy) to be advancing contin-
ually - offering significant new theories, subject to continued and rigorous efforts at falsi-
fication and refinement - than they are to expect new insights on the same order of
magnitude from a life science (like biology). This unfortunate misperception makes many
more resistant (albeit unintentionally so) to evaluating, accepting, and validating signifi-
cant movement on the frontiers of biological theory.
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the application of evolutionary theory to humankind. This is entirely pre-
mature, regrettable, and intellectually sloppy.
News of the death of sociobiology, biocultural anthropology, evolution-
ary psychology (or whatever else it may be called 6 ) is greatly exagger-
ated.17 Academics, of all audiences, should know that ideas, especially
new ideas, often develop through an endless cycle of thesis, antithesis,
and synthesis. Chaff is discarded, surely, but the wheat is saved. Many of
the most important principles central to sociobiological theory have not
only survived, but have in fact flourished in (and been improved by) the
harsh, challenging light of rigorous empirical and theoretical study.
B. The Misperception that Evolutionary Biology Analysis Reasons
from "Is" to "Ought"
A second obstacle to incorporating evolutionary perspectives in analy-
ses of human affairs has been dubbed "The Naturalistic Fallacy," which is
committed whenever one attempts to reason directly from an "is" to an
"ought."' 8 Such a step is illegitimate, of course, because there is no direct
logical path from description to normative conclusion. Cognizant of this,
some critics of the use of evolutionary biology in human affairs point out
that the mere observation that some behavior is evolutionarily adaptive
cannot alone yield the conclusion that our political, religious, or legal sys-
tems should allow or encourage that behavior. A normative conclusion
of this kind can only be derived from outside the facts provided by natu-
ral sciences.
Any invocation of evolutionary biology as relevant to human socio-
legal affairs should be scrutinized for the naturalistic fallacy, for history
16. See supra note 13.
17. See, e.g., So Darwin Was Right After All, Once He Had Evolved a Bit, ECONOMIST,
April 4, 1992, at 107 (referring to "sociobiology's brief flourish a decade ago"); Leon
Kamin's book-jacket review of VAULTING AMBITION, supra note 14 ("There are not many
books that really deserve to be called 'definitive' - but anybody who has been waiting for
a definitive critique of the burgeoning field of sociobiology need wait no longer .... This
makes it possible for Kitcher to salvage what is or may be useful in the work of individual
animal sociobiologists, without sparing the cant, pretentiousness, and just plain errors that
abound in sociobiological speculations applied to humankind"). But see, e.g., Richard D.
Alexander, Evolutionary Approaches to Human Behavior: What Does the Future Hold?, in
HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOUR: A DARWINIAN PERSPECTIVE 317 (Laura Betzig et
al. eds., 1988).
18. See generally EVOLUTIONARY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 28-45; DARWINISM
APPLIED, supra note 1, at 1-21. For an overview of philosophical thought on the naturalis-
tic fallacy, see M. RUSE, TAKING DARWIN SERIOUSLY: A NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO
PHILOSOPHY 86-93 (1986).
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teaches its folly. Herbert Spencer, for example, coined the woefully inac-
curate (though catchy) slogan "survival of the fittest" to justify a laissez-
faire social system he articulated in the mid-eighteen-hundreds. 19 He ra-
tionalized preservation of the economic and political status quo with ob-
servations about the way things simply "are" (he thought) in nature.
Yet those who would now invoke evolutionary biology in a broad-
based and inclusive legal analysis generally admit the illegitimacy of such
rationalizing, and "naturalistic fallacy" objections to each invocation of
biology would seem anachronistically misplaced.20 Although theories of
evolutionary biology remain rather useless without reference to articu-
lated values, biology should not be ignored simply because it is not dis-
positive by itself. It is no less a tool simply because outside forces must
supply its purpose and direction.
Law and economics analysis, for example, may identify an optimally
efficient transaction without purporting to argue that such a transaction
must be implemented without reference to other social values. Similarly,
a law and biology analysis may identify evolutionarily adaptive behavior,
without in any way suggesting that it must be allowed or encouraged.
C. The Misperception that Evolutionary Biology Analysis Is
Genetically Deterministic, Ultimately Negating Free Will
Some see any recognition of biological bases of human behavior as an
outright negation of free will, as if genes always "hard-wired" a person
for certain behavior that he or she would be powerless to prevent.
21 If
that were the case, such a fear would be understandable, and concomitant
concern for the vitality of concepts central to our legal system (such as
intent) would be justified.
Instead, this third obstacle to the invocation of biology in law and pol-
icy analysis seems to be a function of two things: (1) an essentially narcis-
sistic fiction that mind may be entirely divorced from matter, and (2)
misperception of the biological mechanisms by which certain behavioral
patterns may be influenced and genetically inherited.
19. The phrase is often misattributed to Darwin. See generally Richard Hofstadter,
The Vogue of Spencer, in DARWIN 489, 490 (Philip Appleman ed., 1970). The phrase is
inaccurate because success is measured in reproduction, not survival. In many species, the
most "successful" individuals are those that sacrifice their lives in the course of mating, not
those who survive the longest.
20. See, e.g., EVOLUTIONARY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 28-45; DARWINISM AP-
PLIED, supra note 1, at 1-21; Jones, supra note 1.
21. For a discussion of this misperception of evolutionary biology premises, see gener-
ally EVOLUTIONARY JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 30-33.
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First, we have, no problem extrapolating from mice to humans when
ordinary chemicals are at issue. That a mouse may develop cancer after
ingesting specific quantities of substance X often and rightly raises con-
cerns about the effect of the same substance on humans. In these con-
texts, we recognize our biological similarity to mice.
We have grave problems, however, extrapolating from mice to humans
when behavior is involved. After all, we think - and we use this fact as
itself a justification for the belief that learning and culture somehow
decouple individuals from their evolved adaptations.22 To argue other-
wise challenges traditional notions of human social behavior and renders
humankind typical and non-unique (as did the revelation that the earth
orbits the sun and not vice versa).
Yet while it is theoretically possible that humans may somehow have
evolved to the point where there is no biological basis for any human
behavior, there is no reason - none at all - to establish this self-serving
presumption. Deviation from the norm, not conformance with the norm,
bears explanation and justification. In light of currently prevailing and
generally accepted theories of evolution, therefore, those arguing that the
behavior of humans is, alone in the animal kingdom, entirely independent
of genes should properly bear the burden of explaining how this could
come to pass.
For extremely complex, genetically influenced behavior predated and
evolved entirely without human consciousness. No link at all, therefore,
must be forged between the mere fact of consciousness and capacity to
reason, on the one hand, and the existence of complex behavior, on the
other. The obvious effects of higher reasoning upon human behavior in
no way rebuts the presumption, derived from observations of all other
living species on this planet, that much of any organism's behavior can be
traced to genetic factors.23
Second, evolutionary biology in no way suggests that individual humans
are incapable of choosing how to act. While it is true that certain behav-
ioral responses (such as blinking) are effectively hard-wired, evolutionary
biology in fact suggests that human behavior is generally and necessarily
22. For an elaboration of this point, see generally Paul W. Turke, Which Humans Be-
have Adaptively, And Why Does It Matter?, 11 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 305, 312
(1990).
23. See, e.g., Researchers Find Addicts' Gene Pattern: Drug Abuse May Be Mostly He-
reditary, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 1993, at A6 (describing gene patterns common to severe
alcoholics and cocaine addicts as being more than three times more prevalent in addicts
than in non-addicted control subjects).
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a mixture of self-actualizing decisionmaking (by virtue of our capacity for
higher reasoning) and genetically influenced behavioral "predis-
positions."
It bears extreme emphasis that these predispositions are neither com-
mands nor dictates. They are instead tendencies, on the margin, to act a
certain way - all else being equal.24 Genetically influenced behavioral
predispositions have evolved in many creatures to be more susceptible to
variation or negation than have physical structures, because behavioral
flexibility becomes increasingly adaptive in proportion to the complexity
and responsiveness of an organism's environment, especially its social en-
vironment. While genes may determine a tendency to behave in a certain
way, the more advanced an individual's capacity for context recognition,
analysis, and learning, the more external conditions may affect the mani-
festation or repression of a genetically coded behavioral predisposition.
It is in no way necessary to believe that free-will is negated in order to
believe that genetic factors may influence human behavior.
D. Fear of Evil Uses
There are, of course, a number of historical instances in which the at-
tempt to invoke biology as relevant to human affairs was misguided and
disastrous. Adolf Hitler, for example, pursued a centralized, authorita-
rian, selective killing and breeding regime purportedly designed to purify
the Aryan race. Together, such instances present a significant, popular,
and fourth obstacle to incorporating evolutionary biology perspectives,
raising prudent suspicion in those to whom evolutionary biologists might
laud the virtues of biological perspectives on socio-legal issues.
But perverted uses of the past should not forever dictate reflexive re-
vulsion to intimations of genetic bases of human behavior. Such reflexes,
for example, recently prevented a conference that would have addressed
the biological component of a Department of Health and Human Serv-
ices (HHS) initiative for identifying social, psychological, and biological
factors contributing to violence. The National Institutes of Health (NIH)
had planned to sponsor the conference, entitled "Genetic Factors in
Crime: Findings, Uses and Implications," but in April of 1993 froze and
ultimately withdrew financing due to public protests that the conference
24. The propensity may simply reflect that the behavior is more likely to occur than
not to occur, in the absence of extrinsic factors. In humans, for example, conscious analysis
or cultural influences may easily overcome many predispositions. See generally John H.
Beckstrom, The Potential Dangers and Benefits of Introducing Sociobiology to Lawyers, 79
Nw. U. L. REv. 1279 (1984-85).
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was inherently racist.25 One prominent critic described his opposition to
the conference as "trying to stop another Holocaust.
26
The offending phrase in the brochure advertising the conference stated
that "genetic research holds out the prospect of identifying individuals
who may be predisposed to certain kinds of criminal conduct, of isolating
environmental features which trigger those predispositions, and of treat-
ing some predispositions with drugs and unintrusive therapies., 27 Con-
cerned that the conference participants might present research suggesting
that such genetic predispositions might appear more frequently in indi-
viduals of particular races, vocal opposition charged that the meeting
could legitimize racist views.
Doubtless, studies that might have correlated race and undesirable
characteristics or predispositions should be subject to heightened and rig-
orous public and academic scrutiny. For labeling a finding or theory "sci-
entific" (accurately or inaccurately) may collaterally lend legitimacy to
political views, regardless of whether the underlying science has been
misperceived or misappropriated. Yet the principle of precluding studies
into averting behavior deemed socially undesirable (particularly behav-
ior, such as violence, that is quite broadly and inter-racially deemed so)
on the basis that conclusions that might be reached might also be used in
nefarious and pernicious ways is improperly censorial and counter-pro-
ductive.28 It is speculative, and it deprives the marketplace of ideas.
First, in this case, race is just one of thousands of genetically influenced
characteristics that, as a matter of thorough inquiry, may or may not cor-
relate in any significant way to predispositions to any given behavior.
Second, one must not lose sight of the fact that behavioral predispositions
are almost invariably defined in reference to specific patterns of environ-
25. The title of the conference was perhaps unfortunate, since "crime" is a social not
biological construct. Note, however, that an NIH appeals board subsequently determined
that the conference had been improperly aborted, and has opened the way to continue
funding and expand study of any biological bases of violence. See Eliot Marshall, NIH Told
to Reconsider Crime Meeting, 262 SCIENCE 23, 23-24 (1993). In the meantime, evidence of
genetic influences on violence continues to accumulate. See, e.g., Natalie Angier, Gene Tie
to Male Violence Is Studied, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 22, 1993, at A21 (describing study of Dutch
family members correlating shared gene with propensity towards aggressive behavior).
26. Richard Stone, HHS 'Violence Initiative' Caught in a Crossfire, 258 SCIENCE 212
(1992).
27. NIH Cancels University of Maryland Conference on Genetics Factors in Crime,
HEALTH NEWS DAILY, Apr. 23, 1993, at 3.
28. This is not meant to suggest that the government must undertake to fund studies
without regard to their nature. Rather, having so funded, the potential unpopularity of
views expressed should not alone be cause to silence them.
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mental stimuli. It is therefore as likely that many humans (regardless of
race) share a predisposition to act certain ways in given contexts as it is
that certain populations of the species share a less common predisposi-
tion to exhibit a specific behavior in response to a broader spectrum of
environmental stimuli.
While it is true that ideas, once formulated and articulated, can rarely
be externally controlled, it is also true that new ideas cannot be fully eval-
uated until they are articulated. Attempts at prior control, therefore,
(like those exercised to cancel the NIH conference) must typically ante-
date a reasoned critique of ideas, and may thus preclude the potential
benefit as easily as the potential danger. There are few ideas that could
not be turned to evil purposes by those bent upon doing so. That the
manifestations of biological analyses of human affairs have been rather
protean, and sometimes repugnant, however, is more a function of dispa-
rate human motivations than it is of the intrinsic evil of the inquiry.
III. ROLES FOR EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY IN SOCIO-LEGAL ANALYSIS
These obstacles to the use of evolutionary analysis in human affairs
have generally obscured recognition of its utility. Yet there are at least
three ways in which evolutionary biology can illuminate socio-legal
analysis.
A. Predicting Patterns of Behavior
By studying the effects of natural selection on genetically influenced
traits, evolutionary biology predicts that behavioral responses tending to
increase an individual's inclusive fitness will generally be more wide-
spread in a population than specific, genetically influenced, and contem-
poraneously appearing alternative behaviors tending to decrease
inclusive fitness, or to increase it in smaller increments. Consequently,
evolutionary biology can contribute to the prediction of large scale pat-
terns of human behavior. This may prove useful in the identification of
contexts in which behavior deemed socially undesirable, such as child
abuse, may likely occur.
For example, Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, who have written exten-
sively on the evolutionary perspectives on homicide, recently reported
that infants in Canada and Great Britain were sixty to seventy times more
likely to die at the hand of a stepparent than a natural parent.29 While
29. Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Evolutionists Take the Long View on Sex and Vio-
lence, 261 SCIENCE 987 (1993). Although efforts were made to correlate the death of in-
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this was surprising to some, and troubling to all, few evolutionary biolo-
gists were unprepared for this revelation. In fact, an evolutionary biology
analysis would predict that stepparents are more likely to kill stepchil-
dren than are natural parents.3" Such a pattern of selective infanticide is
sufficiently adaptive that it has evolved independently in creatures as di-
verse as insects, birds, fish, and both primate and non-primate
mammals.31
To see why such behavior tends to increase in a population (until other-
wise checked), imagine a local population of monkeys. At the risk of
oversimplification, suppose half the males of the population bear a ge-
netic predisposition to behave a certain way if and when they achieve
dominant status within the group: they are predisposed to treat unrelated
dependent infants sired by a previously dominant male as their own.
Suppose the other half of the males carry an alternative, randomly-aris-
ing, genetic predisposition in the identical circumstance: to kill unrelated
dependant infants.
The latter, infanticidal behavior has two advantages, each of which
makes it more likely to be replicated in successive generations than the
former, adoptive behavior. First, the loss of an infant tends to bring a
female back into estrus more quickly, enabling the selectively infanticidal
new leader to commence his own gene replication more quickly. Second,
and independently, the selective infanticide terminates the diversion of
resources to young non-relatives, ultimately increasing those available to
relatives, who may translate such resources into greater reproductive suc-
cess, thereby increasing the inclusive fitness of the infanticidal male.32
Over scores of generations, the ancestral monkey who simply hap-
pened to carry a gene combination coding for selectively infanticidal be-
havior would obviously leave more descendants than would a monkey
whose genes coded for alternative measures. Given time, the former's
fants to a factor other than the presence in the home of a stepparent, such as poverty, no
other factor was found to correlate to the deaths in a statistically significant way. For
additional background, see Margo Wilson & Martin Daly, Risk of Maltreatment of Children
Living With Stepparents, in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: BIOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS 215
(Richard J. Gelles & Jane B. Lancaster eds., 1987); Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, A Soci-
obiological Analysis of Human Infanticide, in INFANTICIDE: COMPARATIVE AND EVOLU-
TIONARY PERSPECTIVES 487 (Glenn Hausfater & Sarah Blaffer Hrdy eds., 1984)
[hereinafter Infanticide]; DALY & WILSON, supra note 5, at 83-93.
30. Note that the prefix "step" evidently derives from an Old English word meaning
"to deprive" or "to bereave." DALY & WILSON, supra note 5, at 85 (quoting Webster's
Unabridged Dictionary).
31. See generally Infanticide, supra note 29.
32. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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descendants may become sufficiently numerous that the behavior be-
comes rather typical of individuals within the species. Not surprisingly,
therefore, such behavior has in fact evolved independently in a plethora
of species, including langur monkeys.33
This does not mean, of course, that a particular genetic profile is the
proximate cause of any single step parent's neglect or murder of a particu-
lar dependant infant. The specific instance of the behavior may trace to
such things as an unwillingness to invest in another person's child, jeal-
ousy focused on the child's natural parent, economic hardship, or preju-
dice. But evolutionary biology posits an ultimate explanation for the
independent development of such behavior in virtually all lower and
higher social animals: it is the result of selection favoring individuals that
invest only in their genetic relatives, thus favoring the genes underlying
that behavior in those relatives.
The prevalence of selectively infanticidal behavior in other social ani-
mals, from insects to our nearest relatives among the apes, demonstrates
that it can develop and has developed (at least in some creatures) without
any conscious thought whatever. It is therefore entirely plausible
(although probability, admittedly, is a separate calculus) that humans re-
tain a genetically influenced predisposition to selectively eliminate or ne-
glect unrelated but dependent offspring. This may contribute to the
relative prevalence of such behavior in a variety of human cultures.34
If evolutionary biologists observe that stepparent abuse of stepchildren
is often evolutionarily adaptive relative to certain competing behaviors,
useful consequences might flow therefrom. Clearly, there is no reason to
believe that in order to take notice of evolutionary biology we must, for
example, make step-parentage a legal defense to infanticide, or even a
mitigating circumstance at any post-conviction sentencing. There are
many alternatives. If our society abhors murder, particularly of infants,
we might instead incorporate evolutionary perspectives into social plan-
ning by taking extra social and legal precautions against the victimization
of children living with stepparents.35
33. For a detailed explanation of the evolutionary adaptiveness of infanticidal behav-
ior, see TRIVERS, supra note 5, at 71-77. For an examination of infanticide in nonhuman
primates, including langurs, see studies collected in Infanticide, supra note 29, at 145-319.
34. See generally Infanticide, supra note 29, at 145-319; DALY & WILSON, supra note 5,
at 83-93.
35. We might, as but one example, tailor standard operating procedures within a
watch-dog agency, such as a local social service administration, to scrutinize complaints of
child-abuse more closely when adults not genetically related to an allegedly abused child
are present in the home. The use of evolutionary perspectives in the public policy and
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If, in the alternative, we determine that the potential stigmatization
(and perhaps even legal consequences of constitutional proportions) that
such safeguards might engender are themselves unacceptable, we may
choose to do nothing and consider stepparents as biological parents, in-
tentionally exalting legal fiction over predilection. But at least, in so
choosing, we would by virtue of an evolutionary perspective more accu-
rately perceive some of the potential costs of inaction, such as the lives of
those infants whose deaths a policy informed by evolutionary biology
might have prevented.
As they might in the context of child abuse, evolutionary perspectives
may further inform our understanding of, and ability to anticipate the
contextual prevalence of, other behaviors that have adaptive significance.
B. Clarifying the Contours of Socio-Legal Values
Evolutionary biology can also help clarify the contours of developing
values as they face new challenges. To see why, suppose a lawmaker be-
comes concerned about the growth of trait-selection technologies (TSTs),
which enable parents significantly to influence the likelihood that a child
will bear certain traits they prefer.36 She considers: to what extent, if
any, should access to TSTs be protected from government intrusions?
Beginning, of course, with an examination of existing values, she may
turn to and evaluate the amalgam of voices one discerns in the religious,
social, and ethical arenas. She might also fruitfully begin to explore this
question from the perspective of the legal values recently articulated by
the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.3 7
Casey, of course, addresses certain principles that define the rights of
the woman and the legitimate authority of the State respecting abortion,
not trait-selection procedures. Yet it is useful because it begins from the
premise that the Constitution protects some realm of personal liberty that
regulatory contexts will be less problematic than their use in case-by-case adjudication.
The latter raises, for example, concerns parallelling the controversies over the use of drug
courier profiles to justify police stops, and over the use by prosecutors of statistical evi-
dence in criminal cases.
36. For example, preconceptive sperm separation technology now enables parents to
influence the gender of their next child. Developing gene-splicing techniques, using re-
troviral vectors to insert genetic material directly into a chromosome, are expected to offer
more intrusive manipulation. For an analysis of the application of evolutionary biology to
the regulation of such trait-selection technologies, see Jones, supra note 1. See also Owen
D. Jones, Sex Selection: Regulating Technology Enabling The Predetermination of a Child's
Gender, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1992).
37. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
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the government may not enter. While the boundaries of that realm are
unclear, Casey articulates a common and significant thread of logic in re-
productive cases: "the Constitution places limits on a State's right to in-
terfere with a person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood"
- decisions "central to personal dignity and autonomy. 38
In this example, evolutionary biology can help clarify the mechanisms
and effects of procreation. These may increasingly be shown to involve
entire "reproductive strategies,"39 constituting far more than just concep-
tion, birth, and child-rearing. A reproductive strategy has both physio-
logical aspects (such as gestation time and the mechanism of fertilization)
and behavioral aspects (such as the process of attracting mates, number
of offspring, sex ratio of offspring, and the duration, if any, of parental
care).4' Since natural selection operates inexorably upon variations of
genetically passed traits, including reproductive strategies, offspring trait
selection directly and powerfully influences each individual human's re-
productive success and inclusive fitness. Its profound impact upon repro-
ductive success suggests that if we in fact value reproductive autonomy in
the ways the Supreme Court has articulated then, in order to be consis-
tent, access to TSTs might be considered as protectable a liberty as is
access to abortion procedures.41
38. Id. at 2806-07 (emphasis added).
39. "Strategy" is a term of art meaning a precise combination of structures and behav-
iors an individual exhibits in particular environmental situations. (Thus there are defensive
strategies, food-acquisition strategies, reproductive strategies, etc.) The term "strategies,"
although it is used pervasively in the scientific literature, might be misleading to those
unfamiliar with the specific context in which it is used. It does not imply consciousness or
decisionmaking. Neither, for example, need be present in a reproductive strategy.
40. See generally REPRODUCTIVE SUCCESS: STUDIES OF INDIVIDUAL VARIATION IN
CONTRASTING BREEDING SYSTEMS (T.H. Clutton-Brock ed., 1988).
41. This argument is more fully explored in Jones, supra note 1. It is, of course, not
immediately obvious that scientific advances in biology should have any bearing on our
legal system. Yet whenever values are framed in reference to biology, developments in
biology will suggest re-examination and perhaps revision of social and legal conclusions
rooted in those values. For example, today we know (or think we know) that men and
women contribute equally to the genetic makeup of their child. But such an understanding
is of extremely recent vintage. Early in the development of humankind, people did not
understand that men contributed anything significant to creation of new life. Later,.
around Aristotle's time, people believed that men contributed the entire "blueprint" for a
child, while a woman "merely" provided the physical building materials. The point here is
that if you suppose, arguendo, that humans maintained a single value over time, say that
parental responsibility for and control over offspring should be in direct proportion to
biological contribution, women would have had sole control at one time in history, men
primary control at another, and each equal control today. Developments in biology would
help clarify the proper manifestation of prior and shared values.
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C. Suggesting Possible Means Toward Achieving Identified Social
Goals
Evolutionary biology might also help us formulate possible strategies
for pursuing a small set of identified social goals.4 2 No claim could be
made that these are the only mechanisms worthy of consideration, or the
best from among those that other disciplines may also suggest. But evo-
lutionary biology will serve a useful purpose if it does nothing more than
expand options. Moreover, it will serve a practical purpose if it offers
suggestions ultimately deemed worthy of implementation (whether alone,
or in combination with others).
Using an example of Beckstrom's, 43 suppose that reducing sibling in-
cest is a social goal. Because sex between siblings yields offspring that
are, on average, more prone to birth defects than those not born of sib-
lings,44 evolutionary biology suggests that natural selection should favor
any behavioral mechanism that would cause animals to avoid sex with
siblings. Just such a behavioral mechanism appears to be present in
humans; children raised in close, family-like proximity during pre-puberty
years (particularly ages two to six) almost never select each other later as
mates.45 Thus, manipulation of the rearing environment might be used to
discourage sexual relations between children and minors, whether they
are genetically related or not.
IV. COiNICLUSION
An evolutionary perspective on human behavior offers increasingly so-
phisticated and useful insights. By learning more about ourselves, we fur-
ther our efforts at effective self-government. While many have been
reluctant to use an evolutionary perspective as yet another tool of legal
analysis and social planning, most reluctance apparently derives from
42. Beckstrom refers to evolutionary biology, used in this fashion, as a "facilitative
guide." See DARWINISM APPLIED, supra note 1, at 1-5; EVOLUTIONARY JURISPRUDENCE,
supra note 1, at 46-54.
43. See DARWINISM APPLIED, supra note 1, at 32-35.
44. As a technical matter, this is because siblings are more likely than non-siblings to
bear the same recessive (non-dominant) gene (or, more precisely, "allele"). An offspring
receiving two copies of a recessive gene (making it "homozygous") will often manifest the
trait for which it codes. Since genes that adversely affect an organism are more likely to be
recessive than dominant, a child homozygotic with respect to a recessive gene will, on aver-
age, be less fit than a child that is not.
45. See, e.g., Joseph Shepher, Mate Selection Among Second-Generation Kibbutz Ado-
lescents and Adults: Incest Avoidance and Negative Imprinting, 1 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAV. 293 (1971); see also DARWINIsM APPLIED, supra note 1, at 31-35.
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misperceptions of the empirical and theoretical underpinnings upon
which such analysis and planning would build.
Current evolutionary theory, and its application to human social be-
havior, is not what it was twenty years ago, when initial public percep-
tions of it were formed. Nor does it attempt, as some fear, to dictate
reflexive social or legal conclusions solely on the basis of observations of
the natural world. It is neither genetically deterministic nor itself inher-
ently invidious or destructive in its implications for humankind.
An evolutionary perspective is, instead, a valuable supplement to ex-
isting social, behavioral, and psychological sciences. Incorporating evolu-
tionary perspectives into existing disciplines may assist predicting the
prevalence of certain human behaviors. These perspectives can also help
us clarify the contours of existing and developing socio-legal values, and
may even (in more limited circumstances) offer possible mechanisms for
pursuing separately identified social goals.
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